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Abstract
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i. The number of states is three or fewer, or
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A counterexample is provided for each failure of these conditions.
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1 Introduction
A little learning is a dangerous thing.
Alexander Pope
An Essay on Criticism
This is a paper on the value of information. The setting is a two player sender-receiver,
signaling, or communication, game. There is an unknown state of the world, about which the
receiver is uninformed. The receiver is faced with a decision problem but has no direct access
to information about the state. Instead, there is an informed sender, who, after learning the
state, chooses a (possibly costly) action (message)1, which the receiver observes.
We make a minimal number of assumptions. Each player has a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function that may depend on the message chosen by the sender, the state of the world,
and the action chosen by the receiver. Thus, these games include cheap talk games as in
Crawford and Sobel (1982) [8], and signaling games as in Spence (1978) [27] or Cho and
Kreps (1986) [7]. Throughout we assume that the number of states, messages, and actions
are nite.
In this setting, we pose a simple question. Is the receiver’s maximal equilibrium payo
convex in the prior? That is, restricting attention to the equilibrium that maximizes the
receiver’s expected payo, does ex ante learning always benet the receiver? If not, then are
there conditions that guarantee this convexity?
We show that the answer to the rst question is no: the receiver’s maximal equilibrium
payo is not generally convex in the prior. However, there are broad conditions that guar-
antee convexity. If the game is simple–the sender’s message has only instrumental value to
the receiver–then the receiver’s payo is convex in the prior provided either
1. There are at most two states; or
2. The receiver has at most two actions and
1Throughout, in order to distinguish the sender’s action from the receiver’s action, the sender’s action is
termed a message. In some settings, like cheap talk games, this moniker is literal. In some settings, like e.g.
the classic Spence scenario, in which the sender chooses a level of education, message is less tting as a label.
Hence, the reader should keep in mind that the message is simply the receiver’s action.
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i. The game is cheap talk; or
ii. There are at most two messages; or
iii. There are at most three states.
If there are three or more messages, four or more states, and the game is not cheap talk, then
even if the game is simple and the receiver has just two actions, the receiver’s payo may
fail to be convex in the prior. Moreover, if there are three or more states and the receiver
has three or more actions, then the receiver’s payo may fail to be convex in the prior, even
if the game is simple and cheap talk with transparent motives (a cheap talk game in which
each sender has identical preferences over the action chosen by the receiver). Furthermore,
if the game is non-simple then the receiver’s payo may fail to be convex in the prior, even
if there are just two states and two actions.
Why is the receiver’s payo convex in those scenarios described above? Why may the
payo fail to be convex otherwise? There is a crucial trade-o that belongs to ex ante in-
formation acquisition: there is an initial gain in information that, all else equal, benets the
receiver. However, all else may not be equal: the initial learning may result in a belief at
which the receiver-optimal equilibrium may be quite bad for the receiver. Hence, the two
eects may have opposite eects on the receiver’s welfare, in which case the magnitude of
each eect determines whether learning is benecial.
The conditions described above guarantee that the rst eect dominates–even if the re-
sulting beliefs after learning lead to worse equilibria for the receiver, her welfare loss is
guaranteed to be less than the welfare gain from the information acquisition itself. If the con-
ditions do not hold, then the rst eect may not dominate. Even though the receiver gains
information initially, the resulting equilibria may be so bad that the receiver may strictly
prefer not to learn.
Thanks to the ubiquity of communication games, there are numerous interpretations of ex
ante information acquisition. In the Spence (1978) [27] setting, this paper’s question becomes,
“when does any test (prior to the sender’s education choice) benet the hiring rm(s)?” A
seminal paper in nance is Leland and Pyle (1977) [18], who explore an entrepreneur signal-
ing through his equity retainment decision. There, “when does any background information
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or access to the entrepreneur’s history benet a prospective investor?” In a political econ-
omy setting in which an incumbent signals through his policy choice (see e.g. Angeletos,
Hellwig, and Pavan 2006, and Caselli, Cunningham, Morelli, and de Barreda 2014) [1, 6], we
ask, “when does any initial news article benet a representative member of the populace?”
More applications of ex ante information acquisition include reports about the state of
the economy, in the case of a central bank signaling through its monetary policy (Melosi
2016) [20]; product reviews, in the case of a rm signaling through advertising (Nelson 1974,
and Milgrom and Roberts 1986) [23, 22], or through its warranty oer (Gal-Or 1989) [9];
and nancial reports or audits, in the case of a rm signaling through dividend provision
(Bhattacharyya 1980) [3].
The remainder of Section 1 discusses related work, and Section 2 describes the formal
model. Sections 3 and 4 contain the main results of the paper, Theorems 3.1 and 4.1, which
provide sucient conditions for convexity and show that the receiver’s payo may not be
convex should those conditions not hold, respectively. Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related Work
One way to rephrase this paper’s research question is, “if information is free prior to a com-
munication game, then does it benet the receiver in expectation to acquire it?" Ramsey
(1990) [26] asks this question in the context of a decision problem and answers in the ar-
mative, and this result also follows from Blackwell (1951, 1953) [4, 5] among many others.
There are a number of papers that investigate the value of information in strategic in-
teractions (games). Neyman (1991) [24] shows that information can only help a player in a
game if other players are unaware that she has it. Kamien, Tauman, and Zamir (1990) [13]
explore an environment in which an outside agent, “the Maven”, possesses information rel-
evant to an 푛-player game in which he is not a participant. There they look at the outcomes
that the maven can induce in the game and how (and for how much) the maven should sell
the information. Bassan, Gossner, Scarsini, and Zamir (2003) [2] establish necessary and suf-
cient conditions for the value of information to be socially positive in a class of games with
incomplete information.
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In two-player (simultaneous-move) Bayesian games, Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2013)
[17] forward a notion of equivalence of information structures as those that induce the
same distributions over outcomes. They characterize this equivalence for several solution
concepts, including Nash equilibrium. In a companion paper, they (Lehrer, Rosenberg, and
Shmaya 2010) [16] look at the same set of solution concepts in (two-player) common interest
games and characterize which information structures lead to higher (maximal) equilibrium
payos. Gossner (2000) [10] compares information structures through their ability to induce
correlated equilibrium distributions, and Gossner (2010) [11] introduces a relationship be-
tween “ability” and knowledge: not only does more information imply a broader strategy
set, but a converse result holds as well.
Ui and Yoshizawa (2015) [28] explore the value of information in (symmetric) linear-
quadratic-Gaussian games and provide necessary and sucient conditions for (public or pri-
vate) information to increase welfare. Kloosterman (2015) [14] explores (dynamic) Markov
games and provides sucient conditions for the set of strongly symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium payos of a Markov game to decrease in size (for any discount factor) as the in-
formativeness of a public signal about the next period’s game increases. Gossner and Mertens
(2001) [12], Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006) [15], Pęski (2008) [25], and De Meyer, Lehrer, and
Rosenberg (2010) [21] all study the value of information in zero-sum games.
In a sense, this paper explores the decision problem faced by the receiver in which the
information she obtains is endogenously generated by equilibrium play by the sender. That
is, the receiver’s problem is one in which ex ante information acquisition results in a (possi-
bly) dierent information generation process at the resulting posterior belief. Outside of that
there are no strategic concerns; and the sender is perfectly informed, so there is no learning
on his part. Consequently, this paper is more similar in spirit to the original question asked
by Ramsey, and we need not concern ourselves with the possible complexity of information
structures for multiplayer games of incomplete information.
Furthermore, this paper investigates the value of information in communication games,
which are by denition games of information transmission. In contrast to the broad class
of games of incomplete information, in communication games the transfer of information
between sender and receiver is of paramount importance. The main results of this paper
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pertain to a restriction of that class of games–simple games–in which the sender’s message
aects the receiver’s payo only through the information that it contains.
The paper closest to this one is its companion paper, Whitmeyer (2019) [29], which in-
vestigates how a receiver can design an information structure in order to optimally elicit
information from a sender in a communication game. There, in a two player communication
game, the receiver may commit ex ante to a signal 휋 ∶ 푀 → Δ(푋 ), where 푋 is a (compact)
set of signal realizations. Instead of observing the sender’s message, the receiver observes a
signal realization correlated with the message. In one of the main results of that paper, we
discover that in simple two-action games this ability guarantees that the value of informa-
tion is always positive. Contrast this to the negative result that we nd in this paper–that
in simple two-action games the value of information is not generally positive–the other pa-
per turns this on its head and shows that information design guarantees a positive value of
information.
2 The Model
There are two players: an informed sender, 푆; and a receiver, 푅, who share a common prior
about the state of the world, 휇0 ∈ Δ(Θ), where 휇0(휃) = Pr(Θ = 휃). There are two stages to the
scenario–rst, there is a learning stage.
Stage 1 (Learning Stage): There is some nite (or at least compact) set of signal realiza-
tions 푌 and a signal or Blackwell experiment, mapping 휁 ∶ Θ → Δ(푌 ) whose realization is
public. This experiment leads to a distribution over posteriors, where the posterior follow-
ing signal realization 푦 is 휇푦 . Call 휁 the Initial Experiment. Each signal realization begets
(via Bayes’ law) a posterior distribution, 휇푦 . Thus, experiment 휁 leads to a distribution over
posterior distributions, 푃 ∈ ΔΔ (Θ), whose average is the prior distribution:피푃 [휇] ≡ ∫Δ(Θ) 휇푑푃 (휇) = 휇0
Each posterior is the prior for the ensuing communication game. That is, following each
realization of the experiment, the sender and receiver then take part in a second stage, the
communication game.
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Stage 2 (Communication Game): In this stage, 푆 and 푅 share the common prior 휇푦 .
The sender has private information, his type (or the state of the world), 휃 ∈ Θ: he observes
his type before choosing a message, 푚, from a set of messages 푀 . The receiver observes 푚,
but not 휃 , updates her belief about the receiver’s type and message using Bayes’ law, then
chooses a mixture over actions, 퐴. We assume that these sets, 푀,퐴 and Θ, are nite.
Each player, 푆 and 푅, has preferences over the message sent, the action taken, and the type
of the sender. These are represented by the utility functions2 푢푖 , 푖 ∈ {푆, 푅}: 푢푖 ∶ 푀 ×퐴×Θ→ℜ.
Let us revisit the timing. First, there is an initial experiment which begets a distribution
over (common) posterior beliefs, which are each respectively (common) prior beliefs in the
ensuing communication game. Second, 푆 observes his private type 휃 ∈ Θ, and chooses a
message 푚 ∈ 푀 to send to 푅. 푅 observes 푚, updates his belief, and chooses action 푎 ∈ 퐴.
We extend the utility functions for the players to behavioral strategies. A behavioral
strategy for 푆, 휎휃 (푚) is a probability distribution over 푀 ; it is the probability that a type휃 sender sends message 푚. Similarly, a behavioral strategy for 푅, 휌(푎|푚) is a probability
distribution over 퐴; it is the probability that the receiver chooses action 푎 following message푚.
We focus on receiver-optimal Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), which we dene in the
standard manner. Henceforth by equilibrium or PBE, we refer to those particular equilibria,
and by receiver’s payo we mean the receiver’s payo in the receiver-optimal PBE.
Throughout, we consider various sub-classes of communication games. These sub-classes
are dened as follows
Denition 2.1. A communication game is Simple if the receiver has preferences over the
action taken and the type of the sender, but not over the message chosen by the sender.
Equivalently, a game is simple provided the receiver’s preferences are represented by the
utility function 푢푅 ∶ 퐴 × Θ→ ℜ.
On occasion, we derive results that hold for two other classes of communication games;
cheap talk, and cheap talk with transparent motives. We remind ourselves of their denitions:
2Since the domain is nite, any 푢푖 is continuous.
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Denition 2.2. A communication game is Cheap Talk if the sender has preferences over the
action taken by the receiver and the type of the sender, but not over the message he chooses.
Namely, for each type, each message is equally costless. Equivalently, a game is cheap talk
provided the sender’s preferences are represented by utility function 푢푆 ∶ 퐴 × Θ→ ℜ.
A subclass of the class of cheap talk games are those with transparent motives, which
term was introduced in Lipnowski and Ravid (2017) [19]:
Denition 2.3. A communication game is Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives if the game
is cheap talk and the sender’s preferences over the action taken by the receiver are indepen-
dent of his type. Equivalently, a game is cheap talk with transparent motives provided the
sender’s preferences are represented by the utility function 푢푆 ∶ 퐴→ ℜ.
3 When the Value of Information is Always Positive
This section is devoted to establishing the following theorem, which provides sucient con-
ditions for the value of information to always be positive in communication games.
Theorem 3.1. In simple communication games, the value of information is always positive for
the receiver provided
1. There are two states (or fewer); or
2. The receiver has two actions (or fewer) and
i. There are three states (or fewer); or
ii. There are two messages (or fewer); or
iii. The game is cheap talk.
To begin, we show that if there are two states of the world (or two types of sender), the
receiver’s payo is convex in the prior. Observe that if there is no initial experiment, and
the sender and receiver participate in the signaling game with common prior 휇0, then there
exists a signal or experiment 휂 ∶ Θ→ Δ(푀) that is induced by the optimal equilibrium. This
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experiment leads to a distribution over posteriors, where the posterior following message 푚
is 휇푚. Call this experiment the Null-Optimal Experiment.
Lemma 3.2. In any simple communication game with two states and 푛 actions, the receiver’s
payo is convex in the prior.
Proof. We sketch the proof here and leave the details to Appendix A.1. The rst step is to
establish Claim A.1, which allows us to restrict the number of messages in the game to two
without loss of generality. As a result, there are just three cases that we need to consider:
rst, where the sender types pool in the receiver-optimal equilibrium at belief 휇0; second,
where one sender type mixes and the other chooses a pure strategy (in the receiver-optimal
equilibrium at belief 휇0); and third, where both sender types mix. Note that this lemma holds
trivially if there exists a separating equilibrium, so we need not consider that case.
Next, following any realization of the initial experiment, 푦 , there exists a receiver-optimal
equilibrium. Equivalently, there exists a signal or experiment 훾푦 ∶ Θ→ Δ(푀) that is induced
by the optimal equilibrium. This experiment leads to a distribution over posteriors, where
the posterior following message 푚 is 휇푚. Call this experiment the y-equilibrium experiment.
Then, we dene 휉 as the experiment that corresponds to the information ultimately ac-
quired by the receiver following the initial learning and the resulting equilibrium play in the
signaling game. All that remains is to show in each of the three cases that the null-optimal
experiment, 휂, is less Blackwell informative than 휉 and so the receiver prefers 휉–the receiver
prefers any learning.
Note that it is possible to “prove this result without words", which proof is depicted in
Figure 1. In each case, the red point corresponds to the prior, the blue arrows and points
to the initial experiment and posteriors, the yellow arrows and points to the null-optimal
experiment, the green arrows to the y-equilibrium experiments, and the purple arrows and
points to experiment 휉 . ■
Next, we explore convexity when the receiver has only two actions. First, we establish
that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to equilibria in which no type mixes
over messages at which the receiver strictly prefers dierent actions.
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Figure 1: Lemma 3.2 Proof
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Lemma 3.3. In simple games, there exists a receiver-optimal equilibrium in which no type of
sender mixes over messages that induce beliefs at which the receiver strictly prefers dierent
actions.
Proof. The proof is left to Appendix A.2 ■
Second, we discover that if there is a receiver optimal equilibrium at belief 휇0 in which at
most two messages are used, then any information benets the receiver. Formally,
Lemma 3.4. Consider any simple communication game. If there is a receiver-optimal equilib-
rium at belief 휇0 in which at most two messages are used, then any initial experiment benets
the receiver.
Proof. The full proof is left to Appendix A.3. ■
Because of the costless nature of messages in cheap talk games, in conjunction with
Lemma 3.3, it is clear that there must be a receiver-optimal equilibrium at belief 휇0 in which
at most two messages are used. Accordingly, Lemma 3.4 implies
Corollary 3.5. In any 푛 state, two action, simple cheap talk game, the receiver’s payo is convex
in the prior.
From Lemma 3.2 we know that in two state, two action simple communication games,
the value of information is always positive for the receiver. Perhaps surprisingly, the value
of information is also always positive for the receiver in three state, two action simple com-
munication games. Viz,
Lemma 3.6. In simple communication games, for three states and two actions, the receiver’s
payo is convex in the prior.
Proof. Again, we leave the detailed proof to Appendix A.4 but provide a sketch here. From
Lemma 3.3, we conclude that there is a receiver-optimal equilibrium at 휇0 in which at most
three messages are used. If two messages or fewer are used, then from Lemma 3.4, we have
convexity. Thus, it remains to consider the case in which three messages are used. Fortu-
nately, we show that there is just one such equilibrium that we need to consider.
11
Figure 2: Lemma 3.6 Proof
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Like Lemma 3.2, it is also possible to prove Lemma 3.6 without words, which proof is
depicted in Figure 2. The red point corresponds to the prior, the blue arrows and points
to the initial experiment and posteriors, the yellow arrows and points to the null-optimal
experiment, the green arrows to the y-equilibrium experiments (or rather experiments that
are payo-equivalent to the y-equilibrium experiments), and the purple arrows and points
to experiment 휉 . ■
4 When the Value of Information is not Always Positive
This section tempers the optimism inspired by the Section 3. Namely, we establish Theorem
4.1, which states that if none of the sucient conditions from Theorem 3.1 hold in some
communication game, then there may be information that hurts the receiver
Theorem 4.1. In the following communication games, ex ante information may hurt the re-
ceiver:
1. Simple games with four or more states, three or more messages, and two actions;
2. Simple games with three or more states and actions, and two or more messages;
3. Non-simple games with two or more states, actions, and messages.
We begin by proving Lemma 4.2, the rst result listed in Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.2. In simple communication games, for four or more states, three or more messages,
and two actions, the receiver’s payo is not generally convex in the prior.
Proof. Proof is via counter-example. There are four states, Θ = {휃1, 휃2, 휃3, 휃4}, and a belief is
a quadruple (휇1, 휇2, 휇3, 휇4), where 휇푖 ∶= Pr (Θ = 휃푖) for all 푖 = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 휇1 + 휇2 + 휇3 + 휇4 = 1.
The belief can be fully described with just three variables; hence, depicting the receiver’s
payo as a function of the belief requires four dimensions. This is (rather) dicult to do,
so instead we will restrict attention to a family of experiments that involve learning on just
one dimension. That is, we x 휇1 = 1/3 and 휇3 = 1/8, and consider only the receiver’s payo
13
Figure 3: Lemma 4.2 Game
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as a function of her (prior) belief about states 휃2 and 휃4. Learning is on just one dimension,
and so (abusing notation) we rewrite the receiver’s belief 휇2 as 휇 and 휇4 as 13/24 − 휇, where휇 ∈ [0, 13/24].
In states 휃1 and 휃2, action 푎2 is the correct action for the receiver; and in states 휃3 and 휃4,
action 푎1 is correct:
Action 휃1 휃2 휃3 휃4푎1 0 0 1 2푎2 1 1 0 0
Likewise, the sender’s state (type)-dependent payos from message, action pairs are
given as follows:
type 휃1 휃2 휃3 휃4
message 푚1 푚2 푚3 푚1 푚2 푚3 푚1 푚2 푚3 푚1 푚2 푚3푎1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 −1 2 −2푎2 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 4 0 5/4 0 −1
Note that types 휃1 and 휃2 have messages that are strictly dominant (푚1 and 푚2, respec-
tively), and that 휃4 has a message that is strictly dominated (푚3).
Figure 4 depicts the receiver’s equilibrium payo as a function of 휇, 푉 푇 .3 Explicitly, that
function is 푉 푇 (휇) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
3724 − 2휇 휇 ≤ 133613 + 휇 1336 < 휇 ≤ 1324
and its derivation is left to Appendix A.5. The receiver’s payo is no longer convex in the
belief–in fact, it is no longer upper-semicontinuous. If 휇 > 13/36–the receiver becomes too
sure that the sender is not type 휃3 or 휃4–the only equilibria beget the pooling payo, which
correspond to no (or at least no useful) information transmission. The dotted line is a secant
line that corresponds to a binary initial experiment that strictly hurts the receiver. ■
3The super-script 푇 refers to “transparency.” This notation is due to the fact that in Whitmeyer (2019) [29]
we explore the value of information in the case when the receiver can choose the information structure in the
ensuing game. There, we contrast the value of information in that “optimal transparency" setting to the setting
with full transparency, the focus of this paper.
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Figure 4: Receiver Payos (Lemma 4.2 Proof)
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Figure 5: Lemma 4.3 Game
With three or more states and actions, information may harm the receiver:
Lemma 4.3. If there are at least three states, three actions and two messages then the receiver’s
payo is not generally convex in the prior.
Proof. Proof is via counterexample. Consider the game depicted in Figure 5. There are three
types 휃퐿, 휃푀 , and 휃퐻 . Write a belief as a triple (휇퐿, 휇푀 , 휇퐻 ). Note that the game is cheap talk
with transparent motives: each type gets utility 1 if the receiver chooses 푙 or 푠, and 0 if the
receiver chooses 푥 . The receiver’s preferences are given as follows:
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Action 휃퐿 휃푀 휃퐻푙 0 1 2푠 13/24 13/24 1푥 1 0 1
Consider the following three beliefs휇0 ∶= (14 , 14 , 12) , 휇1 ∶= ( 112 , 14 , 23) , and 휇2 ∶= ( 512 , 14 , 13)
and note that 휇0 is a convex combination of 휇1 and 휇2, each with weight 1/2. That is, for some
prior 휇0, 휇1 and 휇2 are the realizations of a binary initial experiment, 휁 .
We depict the three prior distributions in the (푥, 푦)-coordinate plane, where the 푥-axis
corresponds to 휇퐻 , and the 푦-axis corresponds to 휇푀 . There exist three convex regions of
beliefs, 푙, 푠, and 푥 , in which actions 푙, 푠, and 푥 , respectively, are optimal. These regions and
the three beliefs, 휇0, 휇1, and 휇2, are illustrated in Figure 6.
After some eort (relegated to Appendix A.6), we conclude that at beliefs 휇0 and 휇1 the
receiver-optimal equilibrium is one in which 휃퐻 and 휃퐿 choose dierent messages, say 푔 and푏, respectively; and 휃푀 mixes between those messages (푔 and 푏). The receiver’s payos at
these beliefs are 67/52 and 83/52, respectively.
In contrast, at belief 휇2, such an equilibrium does not exist. Instead, the receiver-optimal
equilibrium sees 휃퐻 and 휃푀 choose dierent messages, say 푔 and 푚, respectively; and 휃퐿 mix
between those messages (푔 and 푚). The receiver’s payo is 127/132.
The posteriors corresponding to the y-equilibrium experiments for 휇1 and 휇2 and the null-
optimal experiment are depicted in Figure 7, where each 푥 denotes a posterior distribution.
Finally, we can directly calculate and compare the receiver’s expected payo from this
information acquisition to her payo without obtaining the information:6752 > 21951716 = 12 ⋅ 8352 + 12 ⋅ 127132
whence we conclude that the receiver’s optimal equilibrium payo is not convex in the prior.
Note that this game is a cheap talk game with transparent motives–even these restrictions
are not enough to guarantee convexity. ■
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Figure 6: Lemma 4.3 Action Regions
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Figure 7: Lemma 4.3 Optimal Posteriors
20
An analog to Figure 1 is depicted in Figure 8. There, the red point corresponds to the prior휇0, the blue arrows and points to the initial experiment and posteriors, the yellow arrows and
points to the null-optimal experiment, the green arrows to the y-equilibrium experiments,
and the purple arrows and points to experiment 휉 .
What goes wrong when there are three or more states and actions? Recall the two state
case. In such a setting, because there are only two states, the actors’ beliefs are one dimen-
sional. As a result, any additional information can only shift the belief to the left or right on
the one-dimensional simplex of beliefs. Moreover, because of the of lack of diversity of sender
types, the set of possible equilibrium vectors of strategies is quite small (qualitatively)–they
either pool, separate, both mix, or only one mixes. Consequently, a change in the prior can-
not have too great of an eect on the resulting equilibrium distribution of posteriors: as long
as the change is in the correct direction (and remember, there are only two possible direc-
tions) and/or is suciently small, the receiver-optimal equilibrium from the original prior
remains feasible, and hence the same vector of posteriors can be generated at equilibrium
(albeit with dierent probabilities).
Furthermore, any change in the prior that eliminates the receiver-optimal equilibrium
from the original prior must be large, so large that the resulting belief is more extreme than
any posterior generated by the original equilibrium. Thus, the beliefs that correspond to휉 must be the same, or more extreme than the beliefs from 휂, and hence learning must be
benecial. Put another way, there is a trade-o to initial learning–the gain in information
from the initial experiment versus the (possibly decreased) gain in information from the
receiver-optimal equilibria at the new priors. With two states, the rst eect dominates, and
makes up for the fact that the gain in information from the equilibria may be diminished.
With more than two states, this is no longer true. As in the two state case, initial learning
can result in priors for the communication game for which the receiver-optimal equilibrium
under the original prior is no longer feasible. However, due to the fact that the belief space
is now multi-dimensional, the beliefs generated by the receiver-optimal equilibrium at these
new priors, while more extreme in some direction, do not correspond in general to a more
informative experiment. Hence, 휉 and 휂 may not be Blackwell comparable, in which case
comparisons of the receiver welfare between the no learning and learning scenarios must
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Figure 8: Lemma 4.3 Induced Experiments
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rely on the specic details of the initial experiment and payos of the game. As in the two
state case, there is the same trade-o to initial learning, but now the initial gain may not
dominate.
In the counterexample constructed in Lemma 4.3, the proposed initial experiment is
harmful, since it involves too much learning about whether the state is 휃퐿. In particular,
for belief 휇2, the receiver is too condent that the state is 휃퐿, which precludes the existence
of an equilibrium in which the receiver can distinguish between the high type and the low
type. Instead, the receiver-optimal equilibrium is one in which she can distinguish between
the high type and the medium type, which is much less helpful for the receiver.
As discussed in Whitmeyer (2019) [29], the value of information may not be positive
in this game even when the receiver can choose the optimal information structure in the
signaling game. As we discover in Whitmeyer (2019), the equilibria described above at beliefs휇0, 휇1, 휇2, yield the maximum payos to the receiver of any equilibrium under any information
structure.
Finally, if there are only two states and actions, the receiver’s payo may fail to be convex
in the prior if the game is not simple. To wit,
Lemma 4.4. If the communication game is not simple, then the receiver’s payo is not generally
convex in the prior.
Proof. Proof is via counter example. Consider the modied Beer-Quiche game (cf. Cho and
Kreps (1987) [7]) depicted in Figure 9, in which the receiver now obtains an additional payo
of 1 if the sender chooses Quiche and the receiver chooses the “correct" action (i.e. 퐹 if the
sender is 휃푊 and 푁퐹 if the sender is 휃푆).
If 휇 ≥ 1/2, the receiver optimal equilibrium is one in which the sender types pool on 푄.
The receiver’s best response is 푁퐹 and his expected payo is 2휇. If 휇 < 1/2, the receiver
optimal equilibrium is one in which 휃푊 mixes, choosing 퐵 with probability 휎 = 휇/(1 − 휇), and휃푆 chooses 퐵. The receiver’s expected payo for 휇 < 1/2 is thus Pr(퐵)/2 + 2 Pr(푄) = 2 − 3휇.
Hence,
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휃푊(0, 1) 퐹(2, 0) 푁퐹 퐵 (3, 0)푁퐹
(1, 2)퐹푄
1 − 휇
휃푆
(1, 0) 퐹
(3, 1) 푁퐹 퐵 (2, 2)푁퐹
(0, 0)퐹푄휇
푅 푅
Figure 9: Lemma 4.4 Game
푉 푇 (휇) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩2 − 3휇, 휇 <
122휇, 휇 ≥ 12
Figure 10 depicts 푉 푇 . The receiver’s payo is neither convex nor lower semi-continuous.
The dotted line in the gure is a secant line that corresponds to a binary initial experiment
that strictly hurts the receiver. ■
5 Conclusion
This paper comprehensively answers the question of when information always benets the
receiver in two player communication games. As Theorem 4.1 illustrates, Theorem 3.1 is
as strong as possible–should none of its conditions hold, the value of information may be
strictly negative.
Naturally, there is room for more work on related questions. What can we say, for in-
stance, about the value of information for the sender? Answering such a question would
pose a challenge since the proof techniques used in this paper would no longer work. Here
we are able to bypass the details of the sender’s incentives and work with distributions of
beliefs. This allows us to tackle the problem as a decision problem for the receiver, in which
we apply Blackwell’s theorem. Such an approach would not work when exploring sender
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Figure 10: Receiver Payos (Lemma 4.4 Proof)
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welfare because he is not a decision maker.
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A Proofs
A.1 Lemma 3.2 Proof
Proof. If there exists a separating equilibrium in the game then the result is trivial; henceforth
we consider only simple signaling games that do not admit separating equilibria. Since there
are just two states of the world,Θ ∶= {휃퐿, 휃퐻}, any belief (probability distribution over states)
can be completely characterized by the parameter 휇 ∶= Pr(Θ = 휃퐻 ). The interval of beliefs
can be partitioned into nitely many partitions with boundaries 0 < 휇1 < 휇2 < ⋯ < 휇푘 < 1. If
an action is optimal for a receiver given some belief, 휇, then it is either optimal only at that
belief or it is optimal for a closed interval of beliefs [휇푖 , 휇푗] of which 휇 is a member.
We rst show that it is without loss of generality to restrict the sender to two messages.
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Claim A.1. For any equilibrium that yields the receiver a payo of 푣 in which푚 > 2messages
are used, there exists an equilibrium in which at most 2messages are used that yields the receiver
a payo that is weakly higher than 푣.
Proof. Suppose that 푙 > 2 messages are used. Since there exist no separating equilibria, there
are only two feasible 푙-message equilibria: i. Both types choose a mixed strategy with full
support, or ii. One type (say 휃퐻 ) chooses a mixed strategy with full support, and the other
type chooses a mixed strategy with support on all but one message.
In both cases, there will be 푙 resulting equilibrium beliefs 휇′1 < 휇′2 < ⋯ < 휇′푙 , where in case
ii. 휇′푙 = 1. However since each type is mixing, they must be indierent over each message
in the support of their mixed strategy. Hence, there must also be an equilibrium in both
cases in which only two messages are used, which induce beliefs 휇′1 and 휇′푙 . Indeed such
an equilibrium can be constructed by taking each on-path message 푚푖 with the associated
induced belief 휇′푖 , with 푖 ≠ 1, 푙, and moving weight from each player’s mixed strategy on 푚푖
to message 푚푙 at the ratio Δ (휎퐻 (푚푖))Δ (휎퐿(푚푖)) = Δ (휎퐻 (푚푙))Δ (휎퐿(푚푙)) = (1 − 휇0)휇′푙(1 − 휇′푙 )휇0
Such a process decreases 휇′푖 and by construction maintains 휇′푙 . This can be done until 휇′푖 = 휇′1
for each 푖.
The Blackwell experiment that corresponds to this new, binary, distribution of posteriors
is more informative than in the original situation, where 푙 messages were used. Hence, the
receiver’s payo must be weakly higher in the two-message equilibrium. ■
Thus, suppose that there are just two messages in the game. There are three cases to
consider, each of which is illustrated in Figure 1.
Case 1: For prior 휇0, the receiver-optimal equilibrium is one in which both types pool.
Observe that in this case, the null-optimal experiment is a completely uninformative exper-
iment.
Consider any initial experiment 휁 with 푘 ≥ 2 realizations. Following this experiment,
there are 푘 posteriors, 휇푦 , 푦 ∈ {1,… , 푘}; or equivalently there are 푘 priors in the resulting
signaling game.
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For each realization of the initial experiment, 푦, the receiver’s equilibrium payo in the
resulting signaling game is clearly bounded below by the payo from a pooling equilibrium,
since that corresponds to the least informative (in the Blackwell sense) y-equilibrium exper-
iment. Hence, suppose that in each of the 푘 signaling games, there is a pooling equilibrium,
and that is the receiver-optimal equilibrium.
Finally, dene 휉 as the experiment that corresponds to the information ultimately ac-
quired by the receiver following the initial learning and the resulting equilibrium play in the
signaling game. The null-optimal experiment, 휂, is less Blackwell informative than 휉 and so
the receiver prefers 휉–the receiver prefers any learning.
Case 2: For prior 휇0, the receiver optimal equilibrium is one in which one type mixes and
the other type chooses a pure strategy. Observe that in this case, the null-optimal experiment
begets two posteriors: one that is in the interior on [0, 1] and the other that is either 0 or 1.
Without loss of generality (the other cases follow analogously) suppose that 휃퐻 mixes and
chooses message푚1 with probability 휎 and 휃퐿 chooses message푚1. Following an observation
of message 푚2, the receiver’s belief is 1 and following message 푚1 it is 휇푗 < 휇0. Moreover,
using Bayes’ law we obtain 휎 = (1 − 휇0)휇푗(1 − 휇푗)휇0
Consider any initial experiment, 휁 , with 푘 ≥ 2 realizations. Observe that for any realiza-
tion that yields a belief 휇푖 ≥ 휇푗 , an equilibrium in which 휃퐻 mixes and 휃퐿 does not must also
exist, and hence the receiver’s equilibrium payos for each of these beliefs must be bounded
below by the payo for that equilibrium. As in case 1, suppose that in each case that this
equilibrium is optimal (and hence that the receiver’s payos are at their lower bounds).
For each 푦 such that 휇푦 ≥ 휇푗 , the y-equilibrium experiment is one that sends the poste-
riors to 휇푗 and 1. Consequently, it is without loss of generality to suppose that 휁 just has a
single experiment realization that yields a belief above 휇푗 . Moreover, as in the rst case, any
realization of experiment 휁 that yields a posterior 휇푦 < 휇푗 must beget an equilibrium pay-
o bounded below by the pooling payo. Hence, we suppose that for each such realization푦, the optimal equilibrium is the pooling equilibrium. Moreover, the resulting payo from
this distribution over pooling payos itself is bounded below by the payo were the initial
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experiment to have merely a single signal 푦 that begets a belief below 휇푗 . Accordingly, we
suppose that is the case.
To summarize, 휁 has just two signal realizations, 푦1 and 푦2, corresponding to beliefs 휇1 < 휇푗
and 휇2 > 휇푗 , respectively. 훾1 has just one signal realization, corresponding to belief 휇1. 훾2
has two signal realizations, corresponding to beliefs 휇푗 and 1. Hence, 휉 has three signal
realizations, corresponding to beliefs 휇1, 휇푗 and 1. The null-optimal experiment 휂 has two
signal realizations, corresponding to beliefs 휇푗 and 1.
The resulting distribution over posteriors induced by 휂 has support on 1 and 휇푗 . Likewise,
the resulting distribution over posteriors induced by 휉 has support on 1, 휇푗 and 휇1. Since휇1 < 휇푗 , 휉 is more Blackwell informative than 휂 and so the receiver prefers 휉–the receiver
prefers learning.
Case 3: For prior 휇0, the receiver optimal equilibrium is one in which both types mix.
Observe that in this case, the null-optimal experiment begets two posteriors, both of which
are in the interior of [0, 1].
Let the high type choose a mixed strategy 휎퐻 and let the low type choose a mixed strategy휎퐿. The receiver will have two posteriors, 휇푗 > 휇0 > 휇푙 and using Bayes’ law, we have
휎퐻 = 휇푗 (휇0 − 휇푙)휇0 (휇푗 − 휇푙) , and 휎퐿 = (1 − 휇푗) (휇0 − 휇푙)(1 − 휇0) (휇푗 − 휇푙)
The remainder proceeds in the same way as in the rst two cases, any experiment realization
that yields a belief in the interval [휇푙 , 휇푗] leads to an equilibrium payo bounded below by
the optimal equilibrium payo at belief 휇0, and any experiment realization that yields a belief
outside that interval leads to an equilibrium payo bounded below by the pooling payo.
Ultimately, the null-optimal experiment, 휂, is less Blackwell informative than 휉 (which
corresponds to an information structure that serves as a lower-bound for the receiver’s payo
from learning), so learning must always be benecial.
We have gone through each case, and the result is shown. ■
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A.2 Lemma 3.3 Proof
Proof. Let each action be strictly optimal in at least one state (or else the result is trivial). We
may partition the set of types Θ = Θ1 ⊔Θ2, where Θ1 is the set of types for whom the receiver
strictly prefers to choose action 푎1, and Θ2 is the set of types for whom the receiver strictly
prefers to choose action 푎2. It is without loss of generality to suppose that there are no types
for whom the receiver is indierent between her two actions.
Equivalently, 푣푖 ∶= 푢푅(푎1, 휃푖) > 푢푅(푎2, 휃푖) =∶ 푤푖 for all 휃푖 ∈ Θ1, and 푤푖 > 푣푖 for all 휃푖 ∈ Θ2.
Denote Θ1 = {휃1,… , 휃푡}Θ2 = {휃푡+1,… , 휃푛}
Consider an equilibrium in which at least one type, 휃푘 , mixes. Without loss of generality,
let 휃푘 ∈ Θ1, i.e. he is a type for whom the receiver would strictly prefer to choose action 푎1.
Next, suppose that 휃푘 mixes over a subset of the set of messages, 푀푘 , where
푀푘 = {푚1,… , 푚푙}
with a generic element 푚푘 ∈ 푀푘 . Moreover, 푀푘 is partitioned by three sets, 푀0푘 , 푀1푘 and푀2푘 , where 푀0푘 is the set of messages after which the receiver is indierent between her two
actions, 푀1푘 is the set of messages after which the receiver strictly prefers 푎1, and 푀2푘 is the
set of messages after which the receiver strictly prefers 푎2. By assumption, neither 푀1푘 nor푀2푘 is the empty set, in which case we can pick two messages, 푚1 ∈ 푀1푘 and 푚2 ∈ 푀2푘 . The
receiver’s expected payo at this equilibrium can be written as푉 (휇) = 휇 (휃푘) (휎푘 (푚1) 푣푘 + 휎푘 (푚2)푤푘) + 훾
where 훾 is the remainder of the receiver’s payo that–crucially for the sake of this proof–
does not depend on 휎푘 (푚1) or 휎푘 (푚2). However, the receiver’s payo strictly increases if
instead 휃푘 modied his mixed strategy so that 휎̂푘 (푚1) = 휎푘 (푚1) + 휎푘 (푚2) and 휎̂푘 (푚2) = 0
since 푣푘 > 푤푘 (recall that we stipulated that 휃푘 ∈ Θ1). Moreover, it is easy to see that this
is also an equilibrium: 휃푘 is indierent over any pure strategy in the support of his mixed
strategy; and following messages 푚1 and 푚2 under the new mixture, the receiver still nds
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it optimal to choose 푎1 and 푎2, respectively (and the receiver’s beliefs and payos following
any other message are unchanged).
Since 푚1 ∈ 푀1푘 and 푚2 ∈ 푀2푘 were two arbitrary messages, and 휃푘 was an arbitrary type,
the result follows. ■
A.3 Lemma 3.4 Proof
Proof. Again, let each action be uniquely optimal in at least one state, and let two messages
be used in the receiver optimal equilibrium at belief 휇0 (if only one message is used, the
receiver obtains the pooling payo at 휇0, and hence any initial experiment must be to her
prot).
In addition, we may, without loss of generality, impose that at 휇0 there is an equilibrium
such that, following each message, 푚1 and 푚2, dierent actions, 푎1 and 푎2, respectively, are
strictly optimal. Otherwise, this would just yield the pooling payo and the result would be
trivial. By Lemma 3.3, this imposition ensures that each type is choosing a pure strategy.
Next, partition setΘ1 (dene in Appendix A.2) into two sets,퐺푒1 and퐺푑1 , which correspond
to the types who choose 푚1 and 푚2, respectively. Likewise, partition set Θ2 into two sets 퐺푒2
and 퐺푑2 , which correspond to the types who choose 푚2 and 푚1, respectively.
These sets are, explicitly,
퐺푒1 ∶= {휃1,… , 휃푚} , 퐺푑1 ∶= {휃푚+1,… , 휃푡}퐺푒2 ∶= {휃푡+1,… , 휃푟} , 퐺푑2 ∶= {휃푟+1,… , 휃푛}
Moreover, note that it is possible that some are the empty set; although of course if 퐺푑2 is
nonempty then 퐺푒1 cannot be empty, and similarly for 퐺푑1 and 퐺푒2 .
Next, since we have imposed that an equilibrium of the above form exists at 휇0, such an
equilibrium must exist at any belief 휇 such that the following condition holds:
Condition A.2. 푚∑푖=1 휇 (휃푖) 푣푖 + 푛∑푗=푟+1 휇 (휃푗) 푣푗 ≥ 푚∑푖=1 휇 (휃푖)푤푖 + 푛∑푗=푟+1 휇 (휃푗)푤푗 (퐴1)
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and 푟∑푖=푡+1 휇 (휃푖)푤푖 + 푡∑푗=푚+1 휇 (휃푗)푤푗 ≥ 푟∑푖=푡+1 휇 (휃푖) 푣푖 + 푡∑푗=푚+1 휇 (휃푗) 푣푗 (퐴2)
Accordingly, at 휇0, the receiver’s payo is푉 푇 (휇0) = 푚∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖 + 푛∑푗=푟+1 휇0 (휃푗) 푣푗 + 푟∑푖=푡+1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖 + 푡∑푗=푚+1 휇0 (휃푗)푤푗 (퐴3)
Without loss of generality, we may suppose that there are just three signal realizations:
one, 퐴, after which Condition A.2 holds; one, 퐵, after which there is a pooling equilibrium
for which 푎1 is optimal; and one, 퐶 , after which there is a pooling equilibrium for which 푎2
is optimal. We may make this assumption since the receiver is only aided by multiple signal
realizations in each pooling region. Then the receiver’s expected payo from the initial signal
is bounded below by
푝 [ 푚∑푖=1 휇퐴 (휃푖) 푣푖 + 푛∑푗=푟+1 휇퐴 (휃푗) 푣푗 + 푟∑푖=푡+1 휇퐴 (휃푖)푤푖 + 푡∑푗=푚+1 휇퐴 (휃푗)푤푗]+푞 [ 푚∑푖=1 휇퐵 (휃푖) 푣푖 + 푛∑푗=푟+1 휇퐵 (휃푗) 푣푗 + 푟∑푖=푡+1 휇퐵 (휃푖) 푣푖 + 푡∑푗=푚+1 휇퐵 (휃푗) 푣푗]+ 푠 [ 푚∑푖=1 휇퐶 (휃푖)푤푖 + 푛∑푗=푟+1 휇퐶 (휃푗)푤푗 + 푟∑푖=푡+1 휇퐶 (휃푖)푤푖 + 푡∑푗=푚+1 휇퐶 (휃푗)푤푗]
(퐴4)
where 푝 ∶= Pr(퐴), 푞 ∶= Pr(퐵), 푠 ∶= Pr(퐶), 푝 + 푞 + 푠 = 1,
and 푝휇퐴(휃푖) + 푞휇퐵(휃푖) + 푟휇퐶(휃푖) = 휇0(휃푖) for all 푖. Expression 퐴4 can be simplied to푉 푇 (휇0) + 푞Υ + 푠Γ
where Υ ∶= [ 푟∑푖=푡+1 휇퐵 (휃푖) (푣푖 − 푤푖) + 푡∑푗=푚+1 휇퐵 (휃푗) (푣푗 − 푤푗)] (퐴5)
and Γ ∶= [ 푚∑푖=1 휇퐶 (휃푖) (푤푖 − 푣푖) + 푛∑푗=푟+1 휇퐶 (휃푗) (푤푗 − 푣푗)] (퐴6)
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Since 푎1 is optimal in the pooling equilibrium following message 퐵 and 푎2 is optimal in the
pooling equilibrium following 퐶 we must have푚∑푖=1 휇퐵 (휃푖) (푣푖 − 푤푖) + 푛∑푗=푟+1 휇퐵 (휃푗) (푣푗 − 푤푗) ≥ 푟∑푖=푡+1 휇퐵 (휃푖) (푤푖 − 푣푖) + 푡∑푗=푚+1 휇퐵 (휃푗) (푤푗 − 푣푗) (퐴7)
and
푚∑푖=1 휇퐶 (휃푖) (푣푖 − 푤푖) + 푛∑푗=푟+1 휇퐶 (휃푗) (푣푗 − 푤푗) ≤ 푟∑푖=푡+1 휇퐶 (휃푖) (푤푖 − 푣푖) + 푡∑푗=푚+1 휇퐶 (휃푗) (푤푗 − 푣푗) (퐴8)
Moreover, since Condition A.2 does not hold for belief 휇퐵, we must have either푚∑푖=1 휇퐵 (휃푖) 푣푖 + 푛∑푗=푟+1 휇퐵 (휃푗) 푣푗 < 푚∑푖=1 휇퐵 (휃푖)푤푖 + 푛∑푗=푟+1 휇퐵 (휃푗)푤푗 (퐴9)
and/or 푟∑푖=푡+1 휇퐵 (휃푖)푤푖 + 푡∑푗=푚+1 휇퐵 (휃푗)푤푗 < 푟∑푖=푡+1 휇퐵 (휃푖) 푣푖 + 푡∑푗=푚+1 휇퐵 (휃푗) 푣푗 (퐴10)
Suppose that Inequality 퐴9 holds. then we may substitute it into Inequality 퐴7 and cancel:푟∑푖=푡+1 휇퐵 (휃푖) (푣푖 − 푤푖) + 푡∑푗=푚+1 휇퐵 (휃푗) (푣푗 − 푤푗) ≥ 0
Hence, Υ is positive. On the other hand, if Inequality 퐴10 holds then we may substitute it
directly into Υ, which again must be positive.
A symmetric procedure works at belief 휇퐶 to establish that Γ also must be positive. SinceΓ and Υ are both positive, Expression 퐴4, the receiver’s payo from learning must be at least
weakly greater than 푉 푇 (휇0). We have exhausted every case, and so conclude that any initial
experiment benets the receiver. ■
A.4 Lemma 3.6 Proof
Proof. Denote the set of (three) states by Θ = {휃퐿, 휃푀 , 휃퐻}. For convenience we continue to
use the shorthand 푣푖 ∶= 푢푅 (푎1, 휃푖) and 푤푖 ∶= 푢푅 (푎2, 휃푖), for all 푖 = 퐿,푀, 퐻 . Without loss of
generality, we may assume that action 푎1 is strictly optimal in states 휃퐿 and 휃퐻 , and action 푎2
is strictly optimal in state 휃푀 : 푣퐿 > 푤퐿, 푣퐻 > 푤퐻 , and 푤푀 > 푣푀 .
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Next, observe that we can picture any belief in the (푥, 푦)-coordinate plane, where the푥-axis corresponds to 휇푀 , and the 푦-axis corresponds to 휇퐻 . Dene region 푅1 as the region
in which 푎1 is optimal and 푅2 as the region in which 푎2 is optimal. Each region, 푅1 and 푅2, is
compact and convex, and the two regions share a boundary that is a line segment. Dene 푅
to be the simplex of beliefs, 푅 = 푅1 ∪ 푅2.
From Lemma 3.3, for some prior 휇0, there are just three possible arrangements of the
posteriors that are induced by the null-optimal experiment:
Case 1: All posteriors lie in one region.
Case 2: All posteriors that follow messages chosen by 휃푀 fall in region 푅2, where there is
at least one posterior that does not lie on the boundary 푅1 ∩ 푅2; and all posteriors that follow
messages chosen by 휃퐿 and 휃퐻 fall in region 푅1, where there is at least one posterior that does
not lie on the boundary 푅1 ∩ 푅2.
Case 3: All posteriors that follow messages chosen by 휃퐻 (휃퐿) fall in region 푅1, where
there is at least one posterior that does not lie on the boundary 푅1 ∩ 푅2; and all posteriors
that follow messages chosen by 휃퐿 (휃퐻 ) and 휃푀 fall in region 푅2, where there is at least one
posterior that does not lie on the boundary 푅1 ∩ 푅2. By symmetry, we need focus only on the
case where the posteriors that follow 휃퐻 ’s messages fall in region 푅1.
Note that throughout this proof, by Lemma 3.3, each belief that is not on the line segment푅1 ∩ 푅2 must lie on the boundary of the triangle (2-simplex) of beliefs.
In the rst case, the receiver clearly benets from any initial experiment. The payo
under the prior is the pooling payo, and so ex ante learning can only aid the receiver. The
second case is trickier: there are two sub-cases that we need to examine:
Case 2a: The mixed strategy of each type has support on at least one message that
induces a belief that is not on the boundary 푅1 ∩ 푅2.
Case 2b: There is one type, say 휃퐿, that mixes only over messages that induce beliefs that
are on the boundary 푅1 ∩ 푅2.
In case 2a, it is easy to see that there must also be a receiver optimal equilibrium in which휃퐻 and 휃퐿 each choose one message (possibly the same message) that induces a belief in 푅 ⧵푅2,
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and 휃푀 chooses one message that induces a belief in 푅 ⧵ 푅1. This is clearly an equilibrium,
since each type already has support of its mixed strategy on its respective message; is optimal
for the receiver, since this yields the receiver the maximum possible payo (the separating
payo); and, moreover, does not depend on the prior. Hence, any initial experiment benets
the receiver.
In case 2b, there must exist a receiver-optimal equilibrium in which 휃퐻 sends just one
message, 푚퐻 , which induces a belief in 푅 ⧵ 푅2; 휃퐿 sends just one message, 푚퐿, which induces
a belief on the boundary 푅1 ∩푅2; and 휃푀 mixes between 푚퐿 and 푚푀 , the latter which induces
a belief in 푅 ⧵ 푅1. We will return to this distribution of posteriors shortly.
Case 3 also must be divided into two cases:
Case 3a: 휃퐿 mixes only over messages that induce beliefs that are on the boundary 푅1∩푅2.
Case 3b: 휃퐿 mixes over at least one message that induces a belief in 푅 ⧵ 푅1.
Case 3a is identical to case 2b. In case 3b, there must exist a receiver-optimal equilibrium
in which 휃퐻 sends just one message, 푚퐻 , that induces a belief in 푅 ⧵ 푅2; and 휃퐿 and 휃푀 pool
on one message 푚푝 , that induces a belief in 푅 ⧵ 푅1. Here, only two messages are used and so
by Lemma 3.4 any initial experiment benets the receiver.
Consequently, it remains to consider the scenario that case 2b reduces to: for prior 휇0
just three messages are used as follows: 휃퐻 separates and chooses message 푚퐻 , 휃퐿 chooses
message푚퐿 and 휃푀 mixes between two messages,푚퐿 and푚푀 , in such a way that the receiver
is indierent over her actions following 푚퐿 (note, that there is an equivalent scenario that is
obtained by interchanging 휃퐻 and 휃퐿).
The prior 휇0 must be such that 휇0퐿 ≤ 푤푀 − 푣푀푣퐿 − 푤퐿 휇0푀
and the receiver’s payo is 푣 ∶= 푉 (휇0) = 휇0퐻푣퐻 + 휇0푀푤푀 + 휇0퐿푤퐿
Call this equilibrium 푆†. It is clear that without loss of generality we may focus on an initial
experiment that is binary, and which yields just two beliefs 휇1 and 휇2, where 휇1 is a belief
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such 푆† is feasible, and 휇2 is a belief such that 푆† is infeasible. To see that this is without loss
of generality, note that if there are multiple initial experiment realizations after which 푆† is
feasible, the receiver achieves at least the payo as in the case when there is just one such
initial experiment realization. Likewise, if there are multiple initial experiment realizations
after which 푆† is infeasible, since we need only assume the pooling payo in this case, it is
again clear that the receiver achieves at least the payo as in the case where there is just one
such initial experiment realization.
Thus, the initial experiment, 휁 , yields 휇1 = (휇1퐿, 휇1푀 , 휇1퐻) with probability 푝 and 휇2 =(휇2퐿, 휇2푀 , 휇2퐻) with probability (1 − 푝), where 푝휇1 + (1 − 푝)휇2 = 휇0. For belief 휇2, the receiver’s
payo is bounded below by the pooling equilibrium payo, and so we assume that that is
indeed the payo. Note that since 휇2 is not a belief for which 푆† is feasible, we must have휇2퐿 > 푤푀 − 푣푀푣퐿 − 푤퐿 휇2푀 (퐴11)
Claim A.3. For belief 휇2, action 푎1 is optimal.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that 푎1 is not optimal. That is휇2퐿푤퐿 + 휇2푀푤푀 + 휇2퐻푤퐻 > 휇2퐿푣퐿 + 휇2푀푣푀 + 휇2퐻푣퐻
But then 휇2퐿푤퐿 + 휇2푀푤푀 + 휇2퐻푤퐻 > 휇2퐿푤퐿 + 휇2푀푤푀 + 휇2퐻푣퐻휇2퐻푤퐻 > 휇2퐻푣퐻
where the second inequality follows from Inequality 퐴11. This is a contradiction. ■
Thus, 푎1 is optimal and so the receiver’s expected payo is푉 = 푝 [휇1퐻푣퐻 + 휇1푀푤푀 + 휇1퐿푤퐿] + (1 − 푝) [휇2퐿푣퐿 + 휇2푀푣푀 + 휇2퐻푣퐻]
which reduces to 푉 = 푣 + (1 − 푝) [휇2퐿 (푣퐿 − 푤퐿) − 휇2푀 (푤푀 − 푣푀 )]
which is greater than 푣 by Inequality 퐴11. Case 2b is illustrated in Figure 2. ■
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A.5 Lemma 4.2 Proof and Payo Function Derivation
Proof. We derive the receiver’s payo as a function of the belief 휇 through a pair of claims.
First,
Claim A.4. For any belief 휇 > 13/36, there exists no equilibrium in which a message is played
that induces a belief such that action 푎1 is strictly optimal.
Proof. We can exhaustively proceed through each message:
1. Suppose 푎1 is strictly optimal following 푚1. Then, 휃4 must have support of his mixed
strategy on 푚1. That gives him a payo of −1, so he can deviate protably to 푚2.
2. Suppose 푎1 is strictly optimal following 푚2. Both 휃3 and 휃4 must have support of their
mixed strategies on 푚2. Moreover, so much of their support must be on 푚2 that the
receiver must choose 푎2 following 푚1 (which will always be chosen by 휃1). Hence, 휃3
can deviate protably to 푚1.
3. Suppose 푎1 is strictly optimal following 푚3. Consequently 휃3 must have some support
of his mixed strategy on 푚3 (since 휃4 will never choose 푚3). Moreover, 휃3 cannot be
choosing a pure strategy since otherwise he would have a protable deviation to 푚2.
Hence, 휃3 must be mixing over 푚3 and 푚2 (since 3 is strictly larger than either of 휃3’s
payos for 푚1). The receiver must also mix following 푚2, so as to leave 휃3 willing to
mix. In particular, the receiver must choose 푎2 with probability 2/3 following 푚2 and푎1 with probability 1/3. But note that 휃4 must also have support on 푚2, which message
would thus yield it a payo of 2/3, which is less than 5/4, the payo he would get from
deviating protably to 푚1. ■
As a result 푉 푇 = 13 + 휇 for all 휇 > 13/36. Second,
ClaimA.5. For any belief 휇 ≤ 13/36, the receiver optimal equilibrium begets a payo of 37/24−2휇.
39
Proof. First, an equilibrium that begets such a payo exists. Type 휃1 chooses푚1, types 휃2 and휃4 choose 푚2, and type 휃3 chooses 푚3. Upon observing 푚1, the receiver chooses 푎2, and upon
observing either 푚2 or 푚3 the receiver chooses 푎1.
It is immediately evident that neither 휃1 nor 휃2 have protable deviations, since they
are choosing strictly dominant strategies. On path, 휃4 obtains 2, whereas his payo from
deviating would be less than 2. Finally, 휃3 obtains 3 following 푚3 and less than 3 following
any other message. The receiver’s equilibrium payo is13 + 18 + 2(1324 − 휇) = 3724 − 2휇
Second, it is easy to verify that this equilibrium is optimal for the receiver: 휃4 is unwilling
to choose message푚3 and 휃1 and 휃2 always choose푚1 and푚2, respectively. Thus, the receiver
will always get her decision “wrong" with respect to some mixture of 휃1, 휃2 or 휃4. For 휇 ≤ 1/3,
she prefers to get her decision wrong with respect to 휃2, so our proposed equilibrium is
obviously optimal. For 휇 ∈ (1/3, 13/36], she prefers to get her decision wrong with respect to휃1 but then 휃4 would always have a protable deviation to 푚2. Thus, she gets her decision
wrong with respect to 휃2.
Alternatively, as noted in Whitmeyer (2019) [29], this is the receiver-optimal payo under
any information structure (or any degree of transparency). Therefore, since the receiver can
obtain this payo with full transparency, the corresponding equilibrium must be optimal. ■
Finally, Figure 4 illustrates that 푉 푇 is not convex. ■
A.6 Lemma 4.3 Proof
Proof. It is easy to see that in this game there are no separating equilibrium–type 휃퐿 can
deviate protably by mimicking either of the other types. For each of the three possible
priors (휇0, 휇1, and 휇2) any pooling equilibrium results in the receiver choosing 푙. There exist
pooling equilibria for each prior, and any o-path belief sustains such equilibria, since the
sender types receive their maximal payo on path.
Compiling the remaining equilibria appears daunting (or at least unpleasant), but we can
thankfully bypass this, since we are interested in the receiver optimal equilibria. Instead
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of nding each equilibrium, we take a belief-based approach and construct and solve the
appropriate maximization problem for the receiver.
Observe that the receiver has at most three posterior distributions at equilibrium, which
corresponds to the case in which all three messages are used on path, which messages beget
dierent posterior distributions. Note that any distribution or belief in the context of this
example corresponds to a point in Figure 6. It is a standard result that beliefs are amartingale–
hence, an equilibrium pair of posterior beliefs is feasible only if there exists a line segment
between the two beliefs that intersects the prior (for it to be an equilibrium pair of beliefs,
each posterior must be generated by an equilibrium vector of strategies). Likewise, a triplet
of posteriors is feasible only if the prior lies in the convex hull of the three points.
From this, we see immediately that for each (prior) belief, 휇0, 휇1, and 휇2, it is impossible for
none of the equilibrium posterior beliefs to lie in 푙. Even more, at least one of the posterior
beliefs cannot lie on the boundary between 푙 and 푠 or the boundary between 푙 and 푟 . Hence,
there are four cases: i. All of the posteriors lie in 푙, ii. Some of the posteriors lie in 푠 and some
in 푙, iii. Some of the posteriors lie in 푥 and some in 푙, or iv. There is one posterior in each of푙, 푠 and 푥 .
However, cases iii and iv are impossible: each type strictly prefers 푙 or 푠 to 푥 and thus some
type must have a protable deviation to a message that induces a posterior in 푙. Moreover,
if all of the posteriors lie in 푙, then this yields the same payo to the receiver as the case in
which each type pools and so we may ignore case i.
Consequently, it remains to consider case ii. In addition, note that without loss we may
focus on the situation in which there are just two posteriors since if the optimum consisted
of three posteriors, two of them must lie in the same region, and we could just take their
average, which would also lie in the same region and yield the receiver the same (total)
payo.
As a result, for each (prior) belief 푄, 푄 ∈ {휇0, 휇1, 휇2}, the receiver solvesmax휆,휇1,휇2 {휆푉 (휇1) + (1 − 휆)푉 (휇2)}
subject to 휆휇1 + (1 − 휆)휇2 = 푄
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and 휇1 ∈ 퐵, 휇2 ∈ 퐴, and 휆 ∈ [0, 1]. Substituting in the payos, and with the aid of Figure 6,
we have max휆,휇1퐻 ,휇1푀 ,휇2퐻 ,휇2푀 {휆(휇1퐻 + 1324(1 − 휇1퐻 )) + (1 − 휆)(2휇2퐻 + 휇2푀 )}
subject to 휆휇1퐻 + (1 − 휆)휇2퐻 = 휇0퐻 , 휆휇1푀 + (1 − 휆)휇2푀 = 휇0푀 ,1 ≥ 휆 ≥ 0, 휇1퐻 ≥ 0,13 − 37휇1퐻24 ≥ 휇1푀 ≥ 1124(1 − 휇1퐻 ),휇2푀 ≥ 0, 휇2퐻 + 휇2퐻 ≤ 1
For belief 휇0, 휆∗ = 6/13, and the optimal pair of equilibrium posteriors is
(1324 , 1124 , 0) , and (0, 114 , 1314) (퐴12)
which yields the receiver a payo of 67/52. This corresponds to an equilibrium in which 휃퐻
and 휃퐿 choose dierent messages, say 푔 and 푏, respectively; and 휃푀 mixes between those
messages (푔 and 푏).
For belief 휇1, 휆∗1 = 2/13, and the optimal pair of equilibrium posteriors is(1324 , 1124 , 0) , and (0, 733 , 2633) (퐴12)
which yields the receiver a payo of 83/52. This corresponds to the same type of equilibrium
as for 휇0 (the receiver can distinguish between 휃퐻 and 휃퐿).
For belief 휇2, 휆∗2 = 6/11, and the optimal pair of equilibrium posteriors is(1324 , 1124 , 0) , and ( 415 , 0, 1115) (퐴13)
which yields the receiver a payo of 127/132. This corresponds to an equilibrium in which휃퐻 and 휃푀 choose dierent messages, say 푔 and 푚, respectively; and 휃퐿 mixes between those
messages (푔 and 푚).
The pooling equilibrium payos for each prior are 5/4, 19/12, and 11/12, for 휇0, 휇1, and 휇2,
respectively. Hence, the pooling equilibrium is not optimal for any of the priors, and so the
equilibria that correspond to the posterior pairs given in Expressions 퐴12, 퐴12, and 퐴13 are
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optimal for their respective priors. In Lemma 4.4 in Whitmeyer (2019) [29], we determine
that these are the maximal payos for the receiver at these beliefs under any information
structure, which corroborates the optimality of these equilibria.
It remains to verify 6752 > 21951716 = 12 ⋅ 8352 + 12 ⋅ 127132
and thus the receiver’s optimal equilibrium payo is not convex in the prior. Note that this
game is a cheap talk game with transparent motives–even these restrictions are not enough
to guarantee convexity. ■
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